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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of an interlocutory appeal
from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree or capital
felony under §78-2-2 (3) (h), Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the lower court err in denying the motion of the Defendant

Oklevueha Native American Church and its spiritual leaders, the Defendants
James and Linda Mooney, to dismiss the multiple first and second degree
felony charges against them for "controlled substance criminal enterprise"
under §58-37-8(1 )(a)(iv) of the Utah Controlled Substances Act, §§58-37-1
et seq.; for forfeiture of the Defendant Church's property under §58-3713(l)(g)(2)(a) of the Utah Controlled Substances Act, and for racketeering
under the §76-10-1603 of the "Pattern Of Unlawful Activity Act", §§76-101601 et. seq., based on the Defendants' argument that their conduct as
members of the Defendant Oklevueha Native American Church, in
possessing and providing peyote to other Church members for religious use
in bona fide ceremonies of the Defendant Oklevueha Native American
Church in Benjamin, Utah, is exempt from criminal prosecution under the
federal exception from criminal prosecution for the religious use of peyote
"by members of the Native American Church" contained in 21 C.F.R.

§3107.31 and incorporated in §58-37-4 (2) (a) (iii) of the Utah Controlled
Substances Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Utah Statutory Exemption")?
2.

Does the lower court's interpretation of the phrase "members of

the Native American Church" contained in the Utah Statutory Exemption, as
excluding (1) non-Indian members of the Defendant Oklevueha Native
American Church, and/or (2) Indian members of the Native American
Church who are not members of a federally recognized tribe, violate the
Defendants' rights against an establishment of religion by the State, and
their rights to freely exercise their fundamental religious beliefs and
practices without State interference, under Article I, sections 1 and 4, and
Article III, section 1, of the Utah Constitution?
3.

Does the lower court's interpretation of the phrase "members of

the Native American Church" contained in the Utah Statutory Exemption, as
excluding (1) non-Indian members of the Native American Church, and/or
(2) Indian members of the Native American Church who are not members of
a federally recognized tribe, violate the Defendants' rights to the equal
operation of the laws under Article I, section 24, of the Utah Constitution?
4.

If the lower court's racially and politically restrictive

interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption is correct, which the
Defendants dispute, does the Utah Statutory Exemption violate the

Defendants' rights to due process of law under Article I, section 7, of the
Utah Constitution, because the Exemption is vague on its face and as applied
to the Defendants, because the language of the Exemption fails to provide
adequate notice to ordinary citizens, including the Defendants, that the
language "members of the Native American Church" used in the Exemption,
excludes (1) non-Indian members of the Church, and/or (2) Indian members
of the Native American Church who are not members of a federally
recognized tribe?
5.

Does the lower court's interpretation of the phrase "members of

the Native American Church" contained in the Utah Statutory Exemption, as
excluding (1) non-Indian members of the Native American Church, and/or
(2) Indian members of the Native American Church who are not members of
a federally recognized tribe, violate the Defendants' rights against an
establishment of religion by the State, and their rights to freely exercise their
religious beliefs and practices under the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution?
6.

Does the lower court's interpretation of the phrase "members of

the Native American Church" in the Utah Statutory Exemption, as excluding
non-Indian members of the Native American Church, and/or Indian
members of the Native American Church who are not members of a

federally recognized tribe, violate the Defendants' rights to the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed to Defendants under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court's rulings on issues of law are reviewed for
correctness, granting no deference to the lower court's decision. Bradford v.
Bradford, 1999 UT App 373, 1J10, 993 P.2d 887 (citations omitted), cert,
denied, Bradford v. Demita, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000).
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES IN THE DISTRICT COURT
All of the issues presented in this appeal were preserved in the
Defendants' Motion To Dismiss Information and supporting and reply
memoranda and affidavits and in the State's opposition memorandum in the
lower court, See, Case No. 001404536 (hereinafter, "Case No. 36"), R. 113175, 191-198; 237-256; Case No. 001404537 (hereinafter, "Case No. 37"),
R. 86-87, 88-164, 177-184; Case No. 001404538 (hereinafter, "Case No.
38), R. 75-76; 85-145; 150-157, 186-195)', in the Preliminary Hearing, R.

1 The lower court maintained separate files on each of the three Defendants but did not file copies of each pleading and memorandum filed by the
parties, which were intended to apply to all of the Defendants, in each case
file. Hence, Appellants have referenced the record of each case file where a
cited pleading or memorandum appears.

287/5-15, and in the oral argument on the Defendants' Motion To Dismiss
Information, R. 219/1-27.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 1
[Inherent and unalienable rights.] All men have the inherent and
inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to
acquire, possess and protect property; to worship according to the
dictates of their own conscience; to assemble peaceably, protest
against wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to
communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for
the abuse of that right.
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 4
[Religious liberty-No property qualification to vote or hold office.]
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; no religious test shall be required as a
qualification for any office of public trust or for any vote at any
election; nor shall any person be incompetent as a witness or juror on
account of religious belief or the absence thereof. There shall be no
union of Church and State, nor shall any church dominate the State or
interfere with its functions. No public money or property shall be
appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or
instruction, or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No
property qualification shall be required of any person to vote, or hold
office, except as provided in this Constitution.
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7
[Due process of law.] No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 24
[Uniform operation of laws.] All laws of a general nature shall have
uniform construction.

The Utah Controlled Substances Act,
Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, §§ 58-37-1 et. seq.,
See Addendum 3.
(The Utah) Pattern Of Unlawful Activity Act
Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, §§76-10-1601 et. seq.,
See Addendum 4.
United States Constitution, First Amendment
[Religious and political freedom.] Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for the redress of grievances.
United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
(The Federal) Controlled Substances Act of 1970,21 U.S.C. §801 et seq.
(1970), See, Addendum 5.
Federal Exemption for Religious Use of Peyote By
Members of the Native American Church, 28 CFR § 1307.31:
Native American Church. The listing of peyote as a controlled
substance in Schedule I does not apply to the nondrug use of peyote
in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American Church,
and members of the Native American Church so using peyote are
exempt from registration. Any person who manufactures peyote for
or distributes peyote to the Native American Church is required to
obtain registration annually and to comply with all other
requirements of law.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of This Action And Appeal
This appeal arises out of the State's prosecution of the Defendant

Oklevueha Earthwalks Native American Church ("Defendant Native
American Church") and its spiritual leaders, the Defendants James Warren
Flaming Eagle Mooney and Linda Mooney, on multiple first and second
degree felony charges for their alleged unlawful possession and distribution
of a controlled substance and racketeering, based on the Defendants'
conduct in possessing and providing peyote to other members of the
Defendant Native American Church for religious use in bona fide
ceremonies of the Defendant Native American Church in Utah County,
State of Utah. The Defendants appealfroman interlocutory ruling by Judge
Gary D. Stott of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, State of
Utah, dated September 15,2001, denying the Defendants' motion to dismiss
the criminal charges against them on state statutory and constitutional
grounds and on federal constitutional grounds. See, Ruling, Addendum I.
B.

Proceedings And Disposition In The Lower Court
On November 27, 2000, the State, through the Utah County Attorney,

by Information charged the Defendant Native American Church and the
Defendant James Mooney, with twelvefirstdegree felony counts of

"controlled substance criminal enterprise" pursuant to §58-37-8(1 )(a)(iv) of
the Utah Controlled Substances Act, §§58-37-1 et seq.2 Defendant Linda
Mooney was charged with three first degree felony counts under the Act.3
See, Information, Addendum 2. In the Information, the State also sought
forfeiture of the Defendant Native American Church building and its
property in Utah County, pursuant to §58-37-13 of the Utah Controlled
Substances Act, based on an allegation that the Defendant Native American
Church and its property is "located in close proximity to a controlled
substance, or used to facilitate the manufacture, possession, distribution or
transportation of a controlled substance." See, Utah Controlled Substances
Act, Addendum 3. The Information also charged James and Linda Mooney
with one second degree felony count of racketeering or "pattern of unlawful
activity" under §76-10-1603 of the "Pattern Of Unlawful Activity Act",
§§76-10-1601 et. seq., Addendum 4. See also, Information, Addendum 2.

2 All statutory references are to Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended,
unless otherwise indicated.
3 Under §58-37-8(d) of the Utah Controlled Substances Act, conviction of
each first degree felony count carries a mandatory penalty of "an indeterminate term of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not
eligible for probation." See, Utah Controlled Substances Act, Addendum 3.

On May 16,2001, the Defendants filed Defendants' Motion To
Dismiss Information and a supporting memorandum, seeking dismissal of
the criminal charges against them on state statutory and constitutional
ground and on federal constitutional grounds. See, Case No. 36, R. 113-114;
115-175; Case No. 37, R.86-87; 88-164); Case No. 38, R. 75-76; 85-145.
On May 17, 2001, a Preliminary Hearing on the criminal charges
against the Defendants was held in the lower court. The court declined to
hear the Defendants' Motion To Dismiss Information at that time and
proceeded with the Preliminary Hearing subject to a later ruling on the
Motion. See, Preliminary Hearing Transcript, R. 287/ 5-13; 152-155.
During the Preliminary Hearing, the witnesses subpoenaed by the
State testified that they were either members, or invited guests of members,
of the Defendant Native American Church. The witnesses testified that they
received peyotefromthe Defendants James or Linda Mooney, or another
spiritual leader, for use in religious ceremonies of the Defendant Native
American Church at the Defendant Church in Benjamin, Utah. R. 287, at
17/18-27/4; 27/10-35/22; 36/13-46/17; 46/24-55/10; 55/18-60/17; 61/1368/5; 69/13-76/25; 77/10-85/25; 84/19-85/11; 86/12-91/19; 92/3-99/10;
99/16-107/10. Several witnesses testified that members of the Defendant
Native American Church were not required to make donations to participate

in any Native American Church ceremonies, including peyote ceremonies.
R. 287, at 44/9-23; 54/2-55/3; 67/3-25.
At the conclusion of the Preliminary Hearing, the lower court denied
the Defendants1 motions to dismiss the criminal charges, stating that, even
accepting the Defendants1 argument that, "they were somehow doing what
they were entitled to do legally" ... "I don't have any information that says
that any of the people who appeared here as witnesses today who received
Peyote were Indians, that they were entitled to receive the Peyote." R. 285,
at 3/18-4/3. The lower court bound the Defendants over for trial pending a
hearing on the Defendants' Motion To Dismiss Information on state and
federal constitutional and statutory grounds. R. 285, at 4/4-7/9.
On June 4, 2001, the Defendants filed a Supplemental Memorandum
In Support Of Their Motion To Dismiss Information with the Affidavit of
Salvador Johnson, demonstrating that Defendant Native American Church
and the Defendant James Mooney, as its spiritual leader, had legally
obtained the peyote distributed to Church members for religious purposes.
See, Case No. 36, R. 191-194; Case No. 37, R. 177-180; Case No. 38, R.
150-157. See also, Affidavit of Salvador Johnson, Addendum 6.
On June 25, 2001, the State filed their Opposition to Defendants'
Motion To Dismiss. See, Case No. 36, R. 199-236; Case No. 37, R. 185-224;

Case No. 38, R.158-195, and on July 11, 2001, the Defendants filed their
Reply Memorandum in support of their Motion To Dismiss. See, Case No.
36, 237-256; Case No. 37 (not copied); Case No. 38 (not copied).
On August 1, 2001, the lower court heard oral argument on the Defendants' Motion To Dismiss. R. 286. Thereafter, on September 15, 2001, the
lower court entered a Ruling On Defendant's (sic) Motion To Dismiss,
denying the Motion. See, Ruling, Case No. 36, R. 260-269; Case No. 37,
R.228-237; Case No. 38, R. 198-207, Addendum 1.
On October 3, 2001, the Defendants filed a Petition For Permission
To File An Interlocutory Appeal of the lower court's Ruling On Defendant's
(sic) Motion To Dismiss, which was granted by Order of this Court dated
December 4, 2001.
C.

Statement of Relevant Facts
In addition to the foregoing facts regarding the lower court proceedings

herein, the following undisputed facts were presented in the lower court and
are relevant to this appeal.4

4 In its Ruling, the lower court incorrectly states that the Defendants did
not recite any facts to support their Motion To Dismiss. See, "Statement of
Material Facts", Ruling, at 2, Addendum 1. Conversely, Defendants recited
seventeen paragraphs of "undisputed facts" in the Memorandum In Support
of Defendants' Motion To Dismiss Information, Case No. 36, R. 171-175;
Case No. 37, R. 160-164; Case No. 38, R. 141-145. Defendants also
presented evidentiary facts in the Affidavit of Salvador Johnson attached to

1.

The Defendants James and Linda Mooney are husband and

wife. They are members and have served as the spiritual leaders of the
Defendant Oklevueha Earthwalks Native American Church of Utah, Inc.,
since James Mooney established the Church in April, 1997, pursuant to the
blessing and support of the Rosebud Native American Church of South
Dakota. See, Case No. 37, R. 163,1J1; Case No. 36, R. 245, ^4; 240, f3.
2.

The Defendant Native American Church is a domestic, non-

profit corporation in good standing and authorized to conduct business in the
State of Utah by the Utah Department of Commerce. The Church is located
in Benjamin, Utah. See, Case No. 37, R. 163,ffl[2, 6; 127; Case No. 36, R.
245,W-5.
3.

The Defendant Native American Church is one of more than

1,800 churches and/or chapters that comprise the Native American Church.
Each Church and/or chapter operates under its own by-laws and is free to
define its own membership. Membership in the Defendant Oklevueha
Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum, Case No. 36, R. 191-194; Case
No. 37, R. 177-184; Case No. 38, R. 150-157. The State did not contest any
of these facts in its Opposition to Motion To Dismiss, Case No. 36, (not
copied); Case No. 37, R. 222-224; Case No. 38, R. 193-195. Defendants also
set forth additional evidentiary facts in the Affidavits of James and Linda
Mooney in their Reply Memorandum, Case No. 36, R. 237-246, 254-255;
Case No. 37 (not copied); Case No. 38 (not copied) which the State did not
later dispute or move to strike. Thus, this Court should regard these facts as
undisputed for purposes of this appeal.

Native American Church is open to all individuals who embrace its
fundamental religious beliefs and practices, including the worship of peyote
as a deity and sacrament. Prior to the institution of the criminal proceedings
against the Defendants, the Church had approximately 200-300 members.
The Church is financially supported by donations from its members, See,
Case No. 36, R. 244, ^ 8-11, and issues membership cards to all of its
members. See, Case No. 37, R. 163,1j 2; 124-125.
4.

Defendant James Mooney is a descendent of Native American

Indians indigenous to the United States, including the Creek, Cherokee and
Choctaw (Seminole) Indians and has been a member of a Seminole Tribe
which is not a federally recognized tribe. See, Case No. 36, R. 245, f 3.
5.

Prior to founding the Defendant Native American Church,

James Mooney practiced the Native American religion as a member of other
Native American Church chapters, and also participated as a volunteer and
later as an employee of the State, in providing Native American Indian
programs and services to inmates at the Central Utah Correctional Facility
(CUCF) where he received commendations for his service.5 See, Case No.

5 For several years prior to 1993, James Mooney assisted the police
department in Hurricane, Utah, in controlling the drug problems in that city,
and was certified as a police officer by state authorities in September, 1994.
See, Case No. 37, R. 162,1J 8, 10; 144; 137.

36, R. 244-245,ffi[7;240, f7; Case No. 37, R. 161-163,ffl|4-7,9, 11; 146;
139-140; 135; 132. Linda Mooney was also active as a volunteer in the
Native American programs at CUCF. Case No. 37, R. 163,1|12; 130 (top).
6.

Since 1997, the Defendant Oklevueha Native American Church

and James Mooney have been authorized to obtain peyote for religious use
under regulations of the Texas Department of Public Safety and the United
States Drug Enforcement Agency ("USDEA"). See, Case No. 36, R. 243244,TCI12-13; 195; Case No. 37, R. 161, ffil 14-15; 122, 113. See also,
Affidavit of Salvador Johnson, Addendum 6. All sales of peyote to James
Mooney are documented by receipts issued by the Texas Department of
Public Safety Narcotics Services under the auspices of the USDEA. See,
Case No. 37, R. 161,1f 15; 109.
7.

Peyote is considered a deity and sacrament by members of the

Defendant Oklevueha Native American Church. The Church has never
denied any member the opportunity to participate in a Church ceremony
involving the religious use of peyote because the member did or did not
make a donation to the Church. Case No. 36, R. 243, ^f 14.

8.

At all times prior to the instigation of the pending criminal

charges against them, the Defendants James and Linda Mooney had a good
faith, reasonable belief that their conduct in possessing and providing peyote
to other members of the Defendant Oklevueha Native American Church for
religious use, was protected under the language of the federal exemption
incorporated in the Utah Controlled Substances Act, as interpreted in U.S. v.
Boyll 774 F. Supp. 1333 (D.N.M. 1991), and consciously sought to conform
their conduct to the requirements of law as members and spiritual leaders of
the Defendant Oklevueha Native American Church. See, Case No. 36, R.
255-256, 246, 243fflf15-17; 241, 2381ffll5-l7.
9.

On October 10, 2000, the Utah County officials, acting

pursuant to a warrant, entered Defendant Oklevueha Native American
Church in Benjamin, Utah, and illegally searched the premises and seized
the Defendant Church's sacred pipes, peyote, office equipment, membership
lists and donation records. Utah County police officers and investigators
placed Church members under intense surveillance, interrogated them
regarding their religious beliefs and practices and those of other Church
members, and threatened Church members with criminal prosecution for
participating in Native American Church ceremonies which involve the
worship of peyote as a sacrament and deity. On November 28, 2000, the

State filed the pending criminal charges against the Defendants. Two days
later, the Defendants brought suit in the United States District Court seeking
to redress the violations of the Defendants' state and federal constitutional
rights by the State. See, Complaint, Oklevueha Earthwalks Native American
Church of Utah, Inc., et al. v. Kay Brvson, Case No. 2:00 CV 935K
(U.S.D.C. Utah), Addendum 7. The State moved to dismiss the action based
on abstention due to the pending criminal prosecution. Judge Dale A.
Kimball of the federal district court granted the motion, expressing
confidence that the Defendants could obtain an adequate remedy for the
violation of their constitutional and statutory rights in the state courts. See,
Order, Addendum 8. Thereafter, the criminal prosecution of the Defendants
continued in the lower court, until the lower court issued the interlocutory
Ruling challenged in this appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Defendant Oklevueha Native American Church and its spiritual
leaders, the Defendants James and Linda Mooney, are exempt from criminal
prosecution for possessing and providing peyote to members of the
Defendant Oklevueha Native American Church for religious use in bona fide
Church ceremonies, under the federal exception from criminal prosecution
for the religious use of peyote by members of the Native American Church

contained in 21 C.F.R. §3107.31 and incorporated in §58-37-4(2)(a)(iii) of
the Utah Controlled Substances Act, (referred to herein as the "Utah
Statutory Exemption.") Accordingly, the lower court erred in not dismissing
the criminal prosecution against the Defendants under the exemption.
The racially and politically restrictive interpretation of the language
"members of the Native American Church" contained in the Utah Statutory
Exemption advocated by the State and adopted by the lower court, as
excluding coverage under the Exemption for: (1) non-Indian members of the
Native American Church, and (2) Native American Indian members of the
Native American Church who are not members of a federally recognized
tribe, is contrary to the plain language of the Utah Statutory Exemption and
the evidence demonstrating that many Native American Church chapters and
churches, including the Defendant Oklevueha Native American Church,
have historically included as members, non-Indians and Native American
Indians who are not members of a federally recognized tribe, who embrace
the fundamental religious beliefs and practices of the Native American
Church.
It is undisputed that the worship of peyote as a sacrament and deity
in Church ceremonies, is at the core of Native American Church beliefs and
practices. Thus, the lower court's racially and politically restrictive

interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption, effects a de facto
disqualification from membership in the Native American Church, for
(1) non-Indians, and (2) Native American Indians who are not members of a
federally recognized tribe, by excluding these classes of individuals from the
protection against criminal prosecution for the religious use of peyote
granted to "members of the Native American Church" under the Utah
Statutory Exemption.
The decision as to who may become a member of the Defendant
Oklevueha Native American Church is an internal decision of the Defendant
Church. To have the State dictate the membership of the Defendant
Oklevueha Native American Church at all, let alone on the basis race and
political status, constitutes an intolerable interference and entanglement of
the State with the Defendant Oklevueha Native American Church.
The State does not restrict the membership of any other religious
group within its jurisdiction, and has no compelling interest in doing so, or
in preferring one religion to another by dictating the membership of the
Native American Church but not the membership of other churches.
Similarly, the State does not have any compelling interest in
discriminating between Native American Indian members of the Native

American Church in the protection of their right to use peyote for religious
purposes, on the basis of their unrelated political status, e.g. membership in
a federally recognized tribe.
Moreover, the lower court's racially and politically restrictive
interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption, violates the Defendants'
rights to freely exercise their fundamental religious beliefs and practices as
members of the Defendant Oklevueha Native American Church, and violates
their rights to the equal operation of the laws, by exposing otherwise
similarly situated members of the Defendant Church to different legal
consequences, solely because of their race and political status.
Because the effect of the lower court's interpretation of the Utah
Statutory Exemption burdens the Defendants' fundamental rights and effects
a prohibited classification based on race, it cannot be sustained unless the
State provides evidence to prove that such an interpretation is necessary, and
is the least restrictive means, to achieve a "compelling interest" of the State,
which would override the claimed infringement of the Defendants' religious
rights under Article I, section 1,4 and 24, and Article III, section 1 of the
Utah Constitution, and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.

The United States Supreme Court abandoned the "compelling
interest" test in Employment Division, Dept. of Human Services of Oregon
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 1603, 108 L. Ed. 2d 876 (1990), in
upholding a "neutral and generally applicable" Oregon law criminalizing the
possession of peyote. However, the Utah Statutory Exemption at issue is
neither "neutral" nor "generally applicable", being specifically directed to
the religious use of peyote by "members of the Native American Church."
Hence, the traditional "compelling interest" test applies in determining
whether the lower court's racially and politically restrictive interpretation of
the Utah Statutory Exemption violates the Defendants' state and federal
constitutional rights.
In this case, the State has failed to present evidence of any "compelling interest" for preferring and exempting from criminal prosecution Native
American Indian members of the Native American Church who are
members of federally recognized tribes, while excluding (1) non-Indian
members, and (2) Native American Indian members who are not members of
a federally recognized tribe, from the protection of the Utah Statutory
Exemption. The State has also failed to adduce any evidence that the racially
and politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption is
necessary, or the least restrictive means, of furthering any "compelling

interest", which would override the infringement on the Defendants'
constitutional and statutory rights.
Finally, the lower court erred in failing to dismiss the criminal
prosecution against the Defendants as a violation of their right to due
process of law under Article I, section 7, of the Utah Constitution, because
even if the lower court's racially and politically restrictive interpretation of
the Utah Statutory Exemption is correct, which the Defendants dispute, the
Utah Statutory Exemption, as written, is vague on its face and as applied to
the Defendants, it does not afford ordinary citizens, including the Defendants James and Linda Mooney, adequate notice that the language "members
of the Native American Church" utilized in the Exemption, does not
encompass: (1) members of the Defendant Native American Church who
are not Native American Indians, and (2) Native American Indian members
who are not members of a federally recognized tribe.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the lower court's denial of the
Defendants' motion to dismiss the criminal charges against them was
incorrect and must be reversed by this Court.

ARGUMENT
I

The Lower Court Erred In Ruling That The Utah Statutory
Exception From Criminal Prosecution For The Religious Use
Of Peyote By Members Of The Native American Church,
Excludes Non-Indian Church Members And Native American
Indian Members Who Are Not Members Of A Federally
Recognized Tribe

A.

Utah Law Incorporates The Federal Exemption For The Religious
Use Of Peyote By Members of the Native American Church
Under §58-37-2(1 )(e)(i) of the Utah Controlled Substances Act,

Addendum 3, the term "controlled substance" means:
A drug or substances included in Schedules I, II, HI, IV
or V of Section 58-37-4, and also includes a drug or
substance included in Schedules 7, II, III, IV, or V
of the federal Controlled Substances Act, Title II,
P.L. 91-513, or any controlled substances analog.
(Emphasis supplied)
Peyote is listed as a controlled substance in Schedule I of the Utah
Controlled Substances Act, §58-37-4(2)(a)(iii), Addendum 3, and is also
listed in Schedule I of the federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.
§812(c), Addendum 5. Section 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii) of the Utah Controlled
Substances Act provides that
Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in
another schedule, any material, compound, mixture,
or preparation which contains any
(Q) peyote", is a
Schedule I controlled substance. (Emphasis supplied).

Schedule I of the federal Controlled Substances Act does provide a
specific exception from criminal prosecution for the nondrug, religious use
of peyote by members of the Native American Church. Id. This exception,
codified in Title 21 C.F.R. §1307.31, provides that:
The listing of peyote as a controlled substance in Schedule
I does not apply to the nondrug use of peyote in bona fide
religious ceremonies of the Native American Church, and
members of the Native American Church so using peyote
are exempt from registration. Any person who manufactures
peyote for or distributes peyote to a Native American Church
is required to register annually and to comply with all other
requirements of law.
Thus, pursuant to §58-37-4(2)(a)(iii) of the Utah Controlled
Substances Act, the foregoing exception from criminal prosecution for the
religious use of peyote by Native American Church members, is
incorporated as a statutory exception under the Utah Controlled Substances
Act. This exemption is referred to herein as the "Utah Statutory Exemption."
B.

The Lower Court's Racially And Politically Restrictive
Interpretation Of The Utah Statutory Exception Is Contrary
To Applicable Rules Of Statutory Construction
Although not expressly disagreeing with the Defendants' argument

that the Utah Controlled Substances Act, §58-37-1 et seq., Addendum 3,
incorporates the federal exemption for the religious use of peyote by
members of the Native American Church codified in 21 C.F.R. §3107.31,
the lower court held that the language "members of the Native American

Church" contained in the Utah Statutory Exemption does not apply to nonIndian members of the Native American Church, stating:
This Court agrees with the State that the extension of
protection listed in 21 C.F.R. §1307.31 from prosecution
does not apply to non-Indian members of the NAC. It is
clear to this court that the protection from prosecution
of non-Indians, regardless of whether they are members of
the NAC, is not a 'specific exception' within the meaning
of §58-37-4." (Emphasis supplied).
See, Ruling, 3-4, Addendum 1. The lower court also ostensibly agreed with
the State that the 1994 American Indian Religious Freedom Act
Amendments ("AIRFAA"), further limit the language "members of the
Native American Church" in the federal exemption in 21 C.F.R. §1307.31 to
exclude even Native American Indian members of the Native American
Church who are not members of a federally recognized tribe. See, Ruling, 78, Addendum 1.
1. The Lower Court's Racially And Politically Restrictive
Interpretation Of The Utah Statutory Exception Ignores
The Plain Words Of The Exception
"It is a 'fundamental rule' that constitutional questions should not be
reached if the merits of the case can be determined other than on constitutional grounds." Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Dav Saints,
2001 UT 25, H 30, 21 P.3d 198, citing Hovle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240, 242
(Utah 1980). Thus, the Defendants first address their argument that the

lower court's racially and religiously restrictive interpretation of the Utah
Statutory Exemption is incorrect because it violates the plain language of the
Utah statutory exemption. See, Ruling, at 3-4, Addendum 1.
In State In Interest of A.B., 936 P.2d 1091, 1097 (Utah App. 1997),
the Utah Court of Appeals summarizes the basic rules of statutory
construction applicable in this jurisdiction:
Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this
Court will not look beyond the same to divine legislative
intent. Rather, we are guided by the rule that a statute should
generally be construed according to its plain language."
Brinkerhoffv. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989)
(" ' The best evidence of the true intent and purpose of
the Legislature in enacting the Act is the plain language
of the Act.'" Salt Lake City v. Ohms. 881 P.2d 844, 850
n. 14 (Utah 1994) (explaining statutory language is first
source of statutory interpretation: "The reason for such
a rule is clear. It prevents judges from 'finding' an
ambiguity . . . in an attempt to justify an interpretation
they prefer."); see also 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland
Statutory Construction §45.08, at 35 (5th ed. 1992)
(noting that to interpret statutes by reference to legislative
debates actually erodes due process notice function of
statute.) Furthermore, "unless the statute on its face is
unclear or ambiguous, we find no need to delve into the
uncertain facts of legislative history. Visitor Inf. Ctr.
Auth. v. Customer Ser. Div. Utah State Tax Comm'n.
930 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Utah 1997); accord Salt Lake Child
and Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick. 890 P.2d 1017,
1020 (Utah 1995) (" 'When language is clear and unambiguous,
it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is
left for construction.'" (citations omitted); see also State v.
Valdez, 933 P.2d 400, 401 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (stating
"only if the plain language of the statute is unclear do
we 'resort to legislative history and purpose for guidance.'"

(citation omitted).
See also, accord, World Peace Movement v. Newspaper Agency. 1994 UT
879P.2d253,259.
At least twenty eight states, including Utah, have statutory exemptions
in their drug laws for the religious use of peyote by members of the Native
American Church. See, AIRFAA, 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (a) (3), Addendum 14,
at 1 (28 states); U.S. v. Boyll 774 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (D.N.M. 1991)
("BoyJi") (23 states).
Although some states have chosen to enact a statutory exception from
criminal prosecution for the religious use of peyote by members of the
Native American Church, which restricts the exception by race, blood
quantum, and/or political status, e.g. membership in a federally recognized
tribe, 6 a number of states, including Utah, have opted to incorporate the
language of the federal exemption codified in 21 C.F.R. §3107.31 in their
controlled substances laws, or to create a specific exemption which applies

6 See, e.g. Texas Statutes, Health and Safety Exemptions. $481.111(a).
(exemption for Native American Indians with 25% Native American blood);
Idaho Statutes. §37-2732A (exemption for Native American Indians who are
members, or eligible for membership, in a federally recognized tribe),
collected in Addendum 9.

broadly to all "members of the Native American Church." 7 Several other
states have created a specific exemption for the religious use of peyote by
members of any bona fide religious group,"8 and in Oregon, the bona fide
religious use of peyote is an affirmative statutory defense to criminal
prosecution for possession or delivery of peyote.
Because the states have taken different approaches in addressing the
religious use of peyote by members of the Native American Church, the
7 See, e.g., Revised Code of Washington, §69.50.204; "Unless specifically
excepted by state or federal law or regulation ..."; Alaska Statutes,
§11.71.195 ("a substance ... which is explicitly exempt from criminal
penalty under federal law is exempt from the application of this chapter");
Iowa Statutes, §124.204(exemption for peyote used in bona fide religious
ceremonies of the Native American Church); Oklahoma Administrative
Code, §475:10-2-23 (exemption for non-drug use of peyote in bona fide
religious ceremonies of Native American Church); South Dakota Statutes.
§34-20B-14 (17) ("Peyote, except when used as a sacramental in services of
the Native American Church ... is hereby excepted"); Wisconsin 1999-2000
Statutes, §961.115 (exemption for the nondrug use of peyote and mescaline
in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American Church.");
Minnesota Statutes, §152.02(4), (exemption for "the nondrug use of peyote
in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American Church), collected
in Addendum 10.
8 See, e.g., Colorado Revised Statutes, §18-18-418(3), (exemption for
peyote used in religious ceremonies of any bona fide religious organization);
New Mexico Statutes, §30-31 -6 (exemption for use of peyote in bona fide
religious ceremonies by a bonafidereligious organization); Nevada Revised
Statutes, §453.541, (exemption for peyote use in religious rites of any bona
fide religious organization), collected in Addendum 11.
9 See, Oregon Statutes, §475.992 (affirmative defense for certain peyote
uses), Addendum 12.

scope of the statutory exception under Utah law must be analyzed in the
light of the Utah Legislature's considered approach to the matter, Utah rules
of statutory construction and the unique limitations on the construction of
the Utah Statutory Exemption imposed by the Utah Constitution.
In U.S. v. Bovll, 774 F. Supp 133 ,1342 (D.N.M. 1991), Chief Judge
Burciaga dismissed the federal criminal prosecution of a non-Indian
member of a Taos Native American Church for possession and
transportation of peyote for use in Native American Church ceremonies,
under the federal exception in 21 C.F.R. §3107.31, incorporated in §58-374(2)(a)(iii) of the Utah Controlled Substances Act. (Emphasis supplied)
Employing canons of statutory construction similar to those utilized in by
this Court, Chief Judge Burciaga held that the racially restrictive
interpretation of the federal exception for the religious use of peyote by
members of the Native American Church, advocated by the federal
government in Bovll, and adopted by the lower court in this case, was
inconsistent with the plain language of the exception:

The language of 21 C.F.R. §1307.31 is clear, unambiguous
and wholly consistent with the regulation's history and
purpose. The plain language of 21 C.F.R. §1307.31
exempts all worshipers engaged "in bona fide religious
ceremonies of the Native American Church." The
regulation plainly declares Congress' purpose to exempt
Native American Church members. Nowhere is it even
suggested that the exemption applies only to Indian
members of the Native American Church. Had the intent
been to exclude non-Indian members, as the United
States argues, the language of the exemption would
have so clearly provided. Indeed, the federal peyote
exemption makes no reference whatsoever to a racial
exclusion. Compare 21 C.F.R. §1307.31 & N.M. Stat.
Ann. 30-31-6D (Supp. 1989) with Tex. Health & Safety
Code Ann. §481.111 (Vernon 1989) (including the
language 'the exemption granted to members of the
Native American Church under this section does not
apply to a member with less than 25 percent Indian Blood.")
Bovll at 1338-1339; See also, State v. Wittingham, 504 P.2d 950, 951 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1973) (NAC membership to non-Indians is usually not refused),
cert, denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974).
In the case at bar, the lower court did not examine the plain words of
the Utah Statutory Exemption for the religious use of peyote by members of
a Native American Church. See, Ruling, passim, Addendum 1. However,
the Defendants submit that as in Bovll, a plain reading of the Utah Statutory
Exemption indicates that the Exemption encompasses all members of the
Native American Church without limitation. Had the Utah legislature
desired to restrict the language of the statutory exemption, it would have so

provided. Thus, the lower court's racially and politically restrictive
interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption is contrary to the plain
language of the Exemption covering all "members of the Native American
Church/' and should be reversed.
2.

The History And Tradition Of The Native American Church
As It Bears On The Legislative History Of The Federal
Exception Is Inconsistent With The Lower Court's
Racially Restrictive Interpretation Of The Utah
Statutory Exemption
In examining the legislative history of the federal Native American

Church exception in Boyll, Chief Judge Burciaga made factual findings that
Unlike more traditional churches, the Native American
Church is a non-hierarchical church and has no central
organization which dictates church policy. The Native
American Church consists of a number of loosely
affiliated local chapters. Each chapter is responsible for
establishing its own charter, if it so chooses. "Each
congregation makes its own rules, just as each meeting
is conducted by its own roadman." Peyote Religion at
334. Nevertheless, the teachings of all the Native
American church chapters are essentially the same.
"Church" refers to a body of believers and their shared
practices, rather than the existence of a formal structure
or membership roll. Membership in the Native American
Church derives from the sincerity of one's beliefs and
participation in its ceremonies. Historically, the Church
has been hospitable to and, in fact, has proselytized nonIndians. The vast majority of Native American Church
congregations maintain an "open door" policy and
do not exclude persons on the basis of their race. Racial
restrictions to membership have never been a general part

of the Peyote Religion or of the Native American Church,
(citations omitted). Although one branch of the Native
American Church, the Native American Church of North
America, is known to restrict membership to Native Americans,
most other branches of the Native American Church do not.
As a result, non-Indian members are accepted within the
Native American Church.
Boyll at 1336-1337. Chief Judge Buciaga made further evidentiary findings
regarding the legislative history of the federal exemption, concluding that
During hearings on the federal Controlled Substances Act
of 1970, a representative of the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs, presently the Drug Enforcement Agency,
explained the rationale for the special exemption and assured
Congress that the exemption would not be effected by the new
legislation:
We consider the Native American Church to be sui generis.
The history and tradition of the church is such that there
is no question but that they regard peyote as a deity as it
were, and we will continue the exemption, (emphasis
added). Native American Church, 468 F. Supp. At 1251,
quoting Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1970,
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Public Health &
Welfare of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, House of Representatives, 91 st Cong.,
2dSess. 117-18(1970).
Chief Judge Burciaga also noted that the final order of the Drug
Enforcement Administration in connection with the exemption "made no
mention of any distinction between Indian and non-Indian members of the
Native American Church." Boyll at 1339 (citations omitted).

Based upon the foregoing evidence, Chief Judge Burciaga concluded
that "clearly, the nature and history of the Native American Church played a
significant role in the promulgation of 21 C.F.R. §1307.31, and the history
of the Native American Church attests to the fact that non-Indian worshipers
have always been, and continue to be, active and sincere members of the
Native American Church." Id.10 Similarly, in this case, the Defendants
presented undisputed evidence that since its establishment in 1997, the
Defendant Oklevueha Native American Church has welcomed members of
all races. See, Case No. 36, R. 244,fflj8-11.
The lower court opinion does not discuss or even mention Bovll, but
instead relies on the decisions in Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh,
556 F. Supp. 632, 638 (N.D. Tex. 1983) ("Peyote Way"), and United States
v. Warner, 595 F. Supp. 595, 598-599 (D.N.D. 1984) ("Warner"), as
authority for its racially and politically restrictive interpretation of the
federal exemption. See, Ruling, at 5, 7, Addendum 1. However, in each of
10 In concluding that the "the legislative history clearly does not support a
finding that Congress was interested in a broad exemption for religious use
of peyote by non-NAC members or non-Indians", See, Ruling, at 7,
Addendum 1, the lower court, while not discussing Bovll, relies on the
testimony from the same legislative hearings Judge Burciaga cites in Bovll
to support his conclusion that the basis for the exception was "the unique
history and tradition of the NAC" and that it extended to all members of the
Native American Church, "Indian and non-Indian alike." Compare, Ruling,
at 5, Addendum 1, and Bovll, at 1339.

those cases, the courts held that the federal exemption contained in 21
C.F.R. §3107.31 was limited to Native American Indians with at least 25%
Indian blood, by referring to the bylaws of the Native American Church of
North America (UNACNA"), one of the churches within the Native
American Church that restricts its membership to Native American Indians
who have at least 25% Native American Indian blood. See, Pevote Way, at
638; Warner, at 598-599. Conversely, in Boyll, based on an extensive
evidentiary hearing, Judge Burciaga concluded that the racially restrictive
membership bylaws of the NACNA are not binding on, or representative of,
other Native American Church chapters and that, in fact, most Native
American Church chapters have traditionally accepted non-Indians as
members, such that non-Indian members of the Native American Church are
covered by the exemption. See, Boyll at 1336-1337.
In the absence of any legislative history indicating that the Utah
Legislature intended the statutory exemption of "members of a Native
American Church" to exclude (1) non-Indian members of the Native
American Church and (2) Native American Indians who do not belong to
federally recognized tribes, the lower court erred in so interpreting the
exemption. Accordingly, the lower court's decision should be reversed.

II

The Lower Court's Racially And Politically Restrictive
Interpretation Of The Utah Statutory Exemption Violates The
Defendants' Rights Under The Utah Constitution
Because the lower court denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss

the multiple felony charges against them by adopting the racially restrictive
interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption, the lower court erred in
failing to consider or address the Defendants' arguments that its racially and
politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption violates
the Defendants rights under the Utah Constitution. See, Ruling, passim,
Addendum I.
A.

The History Of The Religious Rights Provisions Of The
The Utah Constitution As A Foundation For Analysis Of
The Lower Court's Challenged Statutory Interpretation
The Utah Constitution provides far more expansive guarantees against

State interference in the rights of individuals to engage in religious worship
than the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, due to the
national concerns for the separation of Church and State that attended Utah's
struggle for admission to the United States. This unique and complex history
is extensively chronicled by the Court in Society of Separationists v.

Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916,920-940 (Utah 1993) ("Whitehead") and need not
be repeated here."
Because of Utah's unique history in the area of Church/State relations,
courts of this State cannot be guided solely by judicial interpretations of
religious rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
As this Court observed
The federal rulings set the floor for federal constitutional
protections which we must respect in interpreting the scope
of our own constitutional provisions. But the federal courts
have an entirely different task before them than do we.
They have only a cryptic sentence to interpret; we have
paragraphs that are expressed in clearer terms and are given
even more vivid meaning by our unique and relatively,
recent history."
See, Whitehead, at 940. Accordingly, the Court concluded in Whitehead,
that
Ultimately, our (statutory) construction is the one most
consistent with the Utah Constitution's religious and
conscience provisions, read in light of the history of the
religious conflict that marked the years Utah struggled to
become a state. Government is not to prefer religion to
nonreligion, but neither should it be hostile to religion.
Religious exercise is to be unfettered, and freedom of
conscience is to be supreme.

11 In Whitehead, the Court recognized a private right of action under
Article 1, Section 4, of the Utah Constitution, to challenge the constitutionality of the Salt Lake City Council's practice of opening their meetings with
prayer as an unlawful establishment of religion. Id. at 992.

Id., (Emphasis supplied); See also, Green v. Zendrian, 916 F. Supp. 493,498
(D. Md. 2996) ("It is axiomatic that questions of sate constitutional law are
to be answered by state courts, rather than by the federal judiciary.")
B.

The Anti-Establishment And Free Exercise of Religion Provisions
of Article I, Sections 1 And 4, And Article III, Section 1 of
The Utah Constitution
Article I, section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides, in pertinent part,

that
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy
and defend their lives and liberties, ... to worship according
to the dictates of their own conscience ....
Article I, section 4 of the Utah Constitution provides that
Religious Liberty - The right of conscience shall never
be infringed. The State shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion ox prohibiting the free exercise
thereof no religious test shall be required as qualification
for any office of public trust or for any vote at any election;
nor shall any person be incompetent as a witness or juror
on account of religious belief or the absence thereof.
There shall be no union of Church and State, nor shall any
Church dominate the State or interfere with its functions.
No public money or property shall be appropriated for
or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction,
or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No
property qualification shall be required of any person to
vote, or hold office, except as provided in this constitution.
(Emphasis supplied)12
12
In Whitehead, this Court observed that, "While we recognize that
portions of Article 1, Section 4 were drawn directly from outside sources,
certain aspects of the provision are unique to Utah. For example, no other
state constitution forbids the union of church and state or the domination
or interference by any church with state functions." Id. at 935 (citations
omitted).

Article III, section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides, in pertinent
part, that:
First: Perfect toleration of religious sentiment is guaranteed.
No inhabitant of this State shall ever be molested in person or
in property on account of his or her mode of religious
worship...
In Whitehead, the Court distilled certain themes underlying the foregoing constitutional provisions, observing that
[R]eading the text of the constitution's religion and
conscience clauses in light of history, we identify three
complementary themes: (i) a distancing of government from
involvement with religion; (ii) nonsectarianism to the extent
there is government involvement with religion, and (iii)
government neutrality - the maintenance of a level playing
field in civil matters - as between religious and non-religious
sentiments." (citations omitted) These themes find expression
in the "rights of conscience'1 and the "perfect toleration of
religious liberties" language in article Ill's ordinance and
seem to have been a natural common ground to the veterans
of Utah's struggle for statehood....
Id. at 936.
With the foregoing historical interpretive principles in mind, the
Defendants turn to an analysis of their claim that the lower court's racially
and politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption,
violates the establishment and the free exercise guarantees of Article I,
sections 1 and 4 and Article III, section 1, of the Utah Constitution.

C.

The Lower Court's Racially And Politically Restrictive
Interpretation Of The Utah Statutory Exemption Violates
Article I, Sections 1 and 4, and Article III, Section 1, Of The
Utah Constitution
As a factual matter, the lower court concedes that the Native

American Church "is an established religion with a significant history of
sacramental peyote use" and that the use of peyote as a sacramental ritual is
a significant process in the religious practices of the NAC" such that "the
State's prosecution of Defendants for their use and possession of (sic)
distribution of peyote may create an imposition or burden on the Defendants
as members of the NAC." See, Ruling, at 3-5, Addendum I.
The Defendants contend that such a burden is not only likely as the
lower court found, but substantial and intolerable, because "the use of peyote
by Native American Church members is the very essence of their religion."
Boyll, at 1342 (citing cases).
Similarly, the Defendants in this case have provided undisputed
evidence that the worship of peyote as a deity and sacrament is the heart of
the religious worship practiced by members of the Defendant Native
American Church. See, Case No. 36, R. 244, 1fl| 8-11 Thus, for the State to
establish racial and political qualifications for membership in the Defendant
Oklevueha Native American Church, by criminalizing the religious use of

peyote by (1) non-Indian members of the Church and (2) Native American
Indian members who do not belong to a federally recognized tribe, deprives
the excluded members of the Defendant Oklevueha Native American Church
of their "inherent and inalienable rights ... to worship according to the
dictates of their own conscience", in violation of Article I, section 1 of the
Utah Constitution, and violates their rights against "an infringement of
conscience", to the "free exercise" of their religious beliefs under Article I,
section 4, and their rights "not to ever be molested in person or in property on
account of his or her mode of religious worship..." under Article HI, section
1, which here involves the use of peyote in religious ceremonies of the
Defendant Oklevueha Native American Church. (Emphasis supplied)
Because the decision as to who may be members of the Defendant
Oklevueha Native American Church is an internal Church decision which
the foregoing constitutional provisions safeguard from interference by State
government, the lower court's racially and politically restrictive
interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption, violates the Defendants'
rights against "an establishment of religion" under Article I, section 4, of the
Utah Constitution, and constitutes an unlawful preference of one religion
over another, in violation of the principles of (i) distancing of government

from involvement with religion; (ii) nonsectarianism to the extent there is
government involvement with religion, and (iii) government neutrality, this
Court held to underlie the guarantees of religious freedom in the Utah
Constitution. See, Whitehead, at 936.
The lower court's racially and politically restrictive interpretation of
the Utah Statutory Exemption for the religious use of peyote by Native
American Church members, if sustained, would also constitute an
establishment of religion and a denial of the free exercise guarantees
contained in Article I, sections 1 and 4, and Article III, section 1, of the Utah
Constitution, by sanctioning the use of state employees, including state
prosecutors and judges, and the use of state funds for the surveillance,
investigation, arrest, detention, criminal prosecution, trial and imprisonment
on felony drug charges, of all non-Indian members of the Defendant
Oklevueha Native American Church, and all Native American Indian
members of the Defendant Church, solely on account of their "mode of
religious worship", e.g. the religious use of peyote in bona fide ceremonies
of the Native American Church. Such a use of the State judicial and
prosecutorial powers and funds violates the "perfect toleration of religious
sentiment" and the protection from State interference and molestation on

account of an individual's "mode of religious worship", guaranteed in
Article III, section 1, of the Utah Constitution.
1. Application Of The Compelling Interest Test
As the lower court agreed, assuming that the State can identify a
compelling interest to support the racially and politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption for the religious use of peyote by
members of the Native American Church, traditional free exercise
jurisprudence requires the State to show that the lower court's racially and
politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption is the
least restrictive means to achieve such an interest. See, Ruling, at 4,
Addendum I, quoting Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment
Security Division, 450 U.S. 707, 718, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 1432, 67 L.Ed.2d 624
(1980). "The compelling interest test reflects the First Amendment's mandate
of preserving religious liberty to the fullest extent possible in a pluralistic
society." See, Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 903, 110 S.Ct. 1595,1613,108 L.Ed.2d
876 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring.)
In Smith, the United States Supreme Court abandoned the compelling
interest test in cases involving a "neutral, generally applicable [criminal]
law", reasoning that the application of such a statute does not implicate First
Amendment concerns. Smith, at 872-873. However, the federal exception

for the nondrug, religious use of peyote by "members of the Native
American Church" contained in 21 C.F.R. §3107.31 and incorporated under
§ 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii) of the Utah Controlled Substances Act, is not a "neutral,
generally applicable criminal law." Instead, the Utah Statutory Exemption is
specifically directed to the religious practices of a particular group of:
members of the Native American Church. Thus, Smith does not apply and
the validity of the lower court's racially and politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption must be assessed under the
traditional compelling interest test. See, Salvation Army v. N.J. Dept. of
Comm. Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 194, 204 (3rd Cir. 1990) (distinguishing
Smith); See also, Boyjl, at 1341 (distinguishing Smith and applying
compelling interest test to federal exemption in 21 C.F.R. §3107.31).
2. The State Has Failed To Carry Its Burden Of Presenting
Evidence To Demonstrate That The Lower Court's Racially
And Politically Restrictive Interpretation Of The Utah
Statutory Exemption Is Necessary And The Least Restrictive
Means Of Achieving Any Compelling State Interest
Although the lower court held that the State has compelling interests
in "dealing with the growing menace of drug abuse in the United States"
and prosecuting the "illegal use of peyote", See, Ruling, at 5-6, Addendum
I, (Emphasis supplied), Congress has specifically found and concluded that
the religious use of peyote by members of the Native American Church

poses no substantial threat to the public health, safety and welfare, and
therefore should be "legal." I3 Hence, the federal exception from criminal
prosecution for the religious use of peyote in Native American Church
ceremonies contained in 21 C.F.R. §1307.31, incorporated in §58-374(2)(a)(iii) the Utah Controlled Substances Act. The very existence of these
exemptions evidences a compelling interest of the State of Utah and the
federal government, in protecting thefreeexercise of religion for members
of the Native American Church. See, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546-547,113 S.Ct. 2217, 2234, 124 L.Ed.2d
417 (1993) (an interest served by a statute is not compelling where the
statutory framework permits derogation of that interest.)
Moreover, the State has failed to present any evidence of a compelling
interest sufficient to demonstrate that the religious use of peyote by (1) nonIndian members of the Defendant Native American Church, or by (2) Native
American Indian members of the Church who are not members of a
13 During the 1994 hearings concerning the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act Amendments (AIRFAA), Congress reaffirmed the factual
findings in Smith that peyote is distinguishable from all other Schedule I
drugs because: (1) it does not cause injury to the religious user; (2) it is
neither physiologically or psychologically addicting; (3) peyote does not
contribute to illegal drug trafficking problems facing America; (4) there is
no known black market for it; and (5) peyote may even be helpful in
controlling alcoholism among Native Americans (and presumably nonNative Americans), H.R. Rep. No. 675,103d Cong., 2nd Sess. 7 (1994).

federally recognized tribe, pose any more of a "substantial threat to public
health, safety and welfare" than the religious use of peyote by Native
American Indian members of the Native American Church who are
members of a federally recognized tribe. "In the absence of evidence, we
cannot simply assume that the psychedelic is so baneful that its use must be
prohibited to a group of [non-Indian] members but poses no equal threat
when used by [Indian] members of the Native American Church." Boyll,
at 1342 (applying First Amendment).
The Defendants also dispute the lower court's conclusion that the
1994 American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments (AIRFAA),
indicates Congress' intent to restrict the federal exemption incorporated in
the Utah Controlled Substances Act, only to Native American Indian
members of Native American Church who are members of federally
recognized tribes. See, Ruling, at 6-7, Addendum I. AIRFA and AIRFAA
are inclusive, not exclusive, and do not mention any intent to limit the
federal exception contained in 21 C.F.R. §3107.31, to exclude (1) nonIndian members, or (2) Native American Indians who are not members of
federally recognized tribes, from the larger class of "Native American

Church members" designated in the exemption. See, AIRFA, Addendum
13, and AIRFAA, Addendum 14.14
Although the lower court suggests that AIRFAA indicates that a
racially and politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory
Exemption is necessary to advance the federal government's "compelling
interests" in fulfilling its duty to protect Native American Indian culture and
religion, Ruling, at 7, Addendum I, the same arguments were recently
rejected by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in U.S. v. Hardman, 297 F.2d
1116, 1128-1129, 1133-1134, (10th Cir. August 5,2002) (rehearing en banc).
In Hardman, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying 1993
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-2000bb-

14 It must also be remembered that Congress enacted AIRFA in 1993 and
AIRFAA in 1994, in reaction to the 1990 Smith decision, which abandoned
the compelling interest test and upheld a general Oregon law which
criminalized possession and use of peyote. Because of the federal
government's special duties and responsibilities with respect to Indian tribes,
Congress was undoubtedly focused on assuring the rights of Native
American Indians to practice their traditional Native American religion by
federal statute in the wake of Smith. However, there is nothing in this
laudable purpose that demonstrates any "compelling interest" in the federal
government to limit the membership in the Native American Church (which
would be contrary to its avowed interest in preserving Native American
culture and religion), by imposing de facto racial or political qualifications
for membership in the Native American Church by restricting the federal
exemption from criminal prosecution to cover only Native American Indians
who are members of a federally recognized tribe.

-4, Addendum 15,15 held that regulations pursuant to a federal statutory
exception under the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act ("BGEPA"),
permitting the possession of bald or golden eagle feathers for religious
purposes and requiring an individual seeking a permit under the exemption
to be "a member of a federally recognized tribe", See, 50 C.F.R. §22.22
(1999), violated the rights of a Native American Indian who was not a
member of a federally recognized tribe. Id. at 1129-1134.
Accepting the federal government's argument that it had "compelling
interests" in (1) preserving Native American culture and religion, and (2)
fulfilling trust and treaty obligations to the federally recognized Indian
tribes" in enacting the challenged permit system, the Tenth Circuit held that
the regulation nonetheless failed under RFRA, because the government
failed to provide evidence to demonstrate that restricting permits to

15 Because RFRA was meant to restore the compelling interest test
previously abandoned in Smith, See, Hardman. at 1129-1130, Hardman
is relevant to the determination of whether the lower court's politically
restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption limiting its
coverage to only Native American Indians who are "members of a federally"
recognized tribe, is the least restrictive means of furthering the government's
"compelling interest" in protecting Native American culture and religion, so
as to override the Defendants' fundamental rights of religious belief and
exercise under Article 1, sections 1 and 4, and Article III, section 1, of the
Utah Constitution.

"members of federally recognized Tribes" was necessary and the least
restrictive means of achieving these compelling interests. Id.
Similarly, in the case at bar, the State has failed to introduce any
evidence to demonstrate that restricting the Utah Statutory Exemption for
the religious use of peyote by Native American Church members to include
only "members of a federally recognized tribes", while excluding (1) nonIndian members, and (2) Native American Indians who are not members of a
federally recognized tribe, is necessary or the least restrictive means of
advancing the federal government's compelling interests in protecting
Native American Indian culture and religion.16 In the absence of such
evidence, the State has failed to carry its burden to justify its infringement of
the Defendants' rights under the "anti-establishment" and "free exercise"
guarantees contained in Article I, sections 1 and 4, and Article III, section 1,
of the Utah Constitution. Thus, the Court should reverse the lower court's
decision denying the Defendants' motion to dismiss the criminal charges

16 "Allowing a wider variety of people to participate in Native American
religion could just as easily foster Native American culture and religion by
exposing it to a wider array of persons." Hardman, at 1133.

against them.
D.

The Lower Court's Racially And Politically Restrictive
Interpretation Of The Utah Statutory Exemption Violates
The Defendants' Right To The Equal Operation Of Laws
The Defendants contend that the lower court's racially and politically

restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption, violates both the
uniform operation of laws provision of the Utah Constitution, Utah Const.
art. I, §24, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, U.S. Const, amend. XIV, §1.
1.

The Relationship Between The Equal Operation Of The
Laws Provision In Article I, section 24, Of The Utah
Constitution And The Federal Equal Protection Clause

Article I, section 24, of the Utah Constitution provides that: "All laws
of a general nature shall have uniform operation." The Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits a state from enacting
laws that deny "any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. Const, amend. XIV, §1. "Both constitutional provisions
incorporate the 'basic principles of equal protection of the law [that J are

17 See, Scott v. Hammock, 870 P.2d 947, 954 (Utah 1994) (Utah statutory
privilege for non-penitential communications between a lay person and a
clergyman should not be interpreted so as to raise serious constitutional
questions under Article I, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution.)

inherent in the very concept of justice and are a necessary attribute of a just
society.' " Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984) ("Malan"),
(internal citations omitted). "[T]he language and history" of the uniform
operation of laws provision contained in Article I, §24 of the Utah
Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
"are entirely different, and even though there are important areas of overlap
in the concepts embodied in the two provisions," [and] ... "the differences
can produce different legal consequences." Gallivan, 2000 UT 89, f 33,
quoting Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 577 (Utah 1993) ("Lee"); See also,
State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 997, (Utah 1995), (quoting Lee); Malan, 693
P.2d at 670.
1.

The Meaning Of The Equal Operation Of The Laws
Provision of Article I, Section 24, Of The Utah Constitution

Article I, section 24, of the Utah Constitution states: "All laws of a
general nature shall have uniform operation." The essence of this constitutional provision is "the settled concern of the law that the legislature be
restrained from the fundamentally unfair practice 'of classifying persons in
such a manner that those who are similarly situated with respect to the
purpose of the law are treated differently by that law, to the detriment of
some of those so classified." See, Gallivan, 2002 UT 89,1J36, citing Blue

Cross & Blue Shield of Utah v. State. 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989)
(quoting Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 752 P.2d at 888.) "In order for a law to
be constitutional under the uniform operation of laws provision, it is not
enough that it be uniform on its face. What is critical is that the operation of
the law be uniform." Lee, 867 P.2d at 577; See also, Mohi, 901 P.2d at 997.
A law does not operate uniformly if persons "similarly situated" are
not "treated similarly" or if "persons in different circumstances" are "treated
as if their circumstances were the same." Lee, 867 P.2d at 577, quoting
Malan, at 669 (Utah 1984). In other words, "when persons are similarly
situated, it is unconstitutional to single out one person or group of persons
from among the larger class on the basis of a tenuous justification that has
little or no merit." See, Gallivan, 2002 Utah 89, ^37, quoting Malan, 693
P.2d at 671. "Therefore, the equal protection principle inherent in the
uniform operation of laws provision protects against discrimination within
a class and guards against disparate effects in the application of laws."
Gallivan, at ^|38. "Ultimately, it is the judiciary's province to decide the vital
and determinative question of 'whether a classification operates uniformly
on all persons similarly situated within constitutional parameters.'" Id.
"Where a legislative enactment implicates a 'fundamental or critical
right' or creates classifications which are 'considered impermissible or

suspect in the abstract,' [the Court applies] a heightened degree of scrutiny.
Gallivan, at ^40, quoting Ryan, 903 P.2d at 426; See also, Peterson, 2002
UT 42 at ^|23; Swayne, 795 P.2d at 647 (Zimmerman, J., concurring and
dissenting); Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 373 (Stewart, J., separate opinion).
3.

Defendants' Claims Under Article I, Section 24

Based upon the foregoing legal principles, the beginning point for
analyzing the lower court's racially and politically restrictive interpretation
of the Utah Statutory Exemption, is to determine whether such an interpretation implicates a "fundamental or critical right", or creates classifications
which are "considered impermissible or suspect in the abstract." Gallivan,
at U41, quoting Ryan, 903 P.2d at 426.
As previously explained, the lower court's racially and politically
restrictive interpretation of the statutory exception, in its operation, critically
impacts the fundamental rights of (1) non-Indian members of the Defendant
Native American Church, and (2) Native American Indian members of the
Church who are not members of a federally recognized tribe", to be free
from the establishment of religion and to fully exercise their religious beliefs
and practices free from molestation or interference by the State. These rights
have been accorded special recognition under Article I, sections 1 and 4, and
under Article III, section 1, of the Utah Constitution. Additionally, the lower

court's exclusion of non-Indians from the protection of the Utah Statutory
Exemption creates a suspect racial classification. Mountain Fuel Supply v.
Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 884, 890 (Utah 1988). ("Race" is generally an
impermissible classification.) Accordingly, the Court must review the lower
court's racially and politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory
Exemption, with "heightened scrutiny" and apply the analytical model
articulated in Lee:
[A] statutory classification that discriminates against a
person's constitutionally protected [fundamental or
critical right]. . .is constitutional only if it (1) is
reasonable, (2) has more than a speculative tendency
to further the legislative objective and, in fact, actually
and substantially furthers a valid legislative purpose,
and (3) is reasonably necessary to further a legitimate
legislative goal.
GalHvan, 2002 UT 89, ^42, quoting Lee, at 582-583.
Before employing the foregoing uniform operation of laws analytical
model, two threshold issues must be considered: "what, if any, classification,
is created, and (2) whether that classification is discriminatory; that is,
whether it treats members of the class or subclasses disparately." See,
Gallivan, ^43, citing Mohj 901 P.2d at 997.
First, the lower court's interpretation of the Utah Statutory
Exemption, as excluding (1) non-Indian members of the Native American
Church, and (2) Native American Indian members who are not members of

federally recognized tribes, creates three subclasses of members of the
Defendant Native American Church, including the two foregoing subclasses,
and (3) a class of Native American Indian Church members who are
members of federally recognized tribes. "These subclasses, while not
expressly created by the statute, result from "the application and operation of
the statute", as interpreted by the lower court. See, Gallivan, at ^|44; See
also, Mohi, at 998, quoting John E. Nowak et al, Constitutional Law 600
(1983) ("A statute which does not on its face create classes may nonetheless
result in classification during the actual application of the statute by those
empowered to administer the law.") Thus, the lower courts racially and
politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption under
consideration in this case "does create a system of classification." Id.
Second, the question arises whether the classification created by the
lower court's racially restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory
Exemption is discriminatory, that is, "whether the members of the class or
subclasses are treated disparately." Gallivan, at ^[45. This question must be
also be answered affirmatively in this case, because the lower court's
racially and politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory
Exemption operates to subject the first two subclasses of Native American
Church members to criminal prosecution for their religious use of peyote in

bona fide Native American Church ceremonies, while retaining the
protection against criminal prosecution under the exemption only for the
third subclass of Native American Church members: Native American
Indians who are members of a federally recognized tribe.
Accordingly, here, as in Mohi, the lower court's racially and
politically restrictive application of the Utah Statutory Exemption, would
allow identically situated members of the Defendant Native American
Church to "to face radically different penalties and consequences" without
any distinction between them, other than their race and political status, e.g.
membership in a federally recognized tribe. See, Mohi, 998. This amounts
to "unequal treatment" of similarly situated persons, as that term has been
used in the context of Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution. See,
Mohi, at 998, citing Blue Cross, 779 P.2d at 637; Malan, 693 P.2d at 670.
"Having determined that a discriminatory classification and disparate
impact exist, [the next question is] "whether that discriminatory
classification is constitutionally permissible under the uniform operation of
laws provision." See, Gallivan, at |[46. For this analysis, we return to Lee's
analytical model. Under Lee, the lower court's racially and politically
restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption fails it
substantially burdens the religious rights of Native American Church

members under Article I, sections 1 and 4, and Article III, section 1, of the
Utah Constitution, and because the State has failed to produce any evidence
that the lower court's interpretation of the Exemption (1) is reasonable;
(2) has more than a speculative tendency to actually further any valid
legislative purpose, and (3) is reasonably necessary to further a legitimate
legislative goal. Accordingly, the lower court's racially and politically
restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption is unconstitutional
under the uniform operation of laws provision of Article I, section 24, of the
Utah Constitution and must be reversed.
E.

The Lower Court's Racially And Politically Restrictive
Interpretation Of The Utah Statutory Exemption Violates The
Defendants' Rights To Due Process Of Law Under Article I,
Section 7, Of The Utah Constitution And The Fourteenth
Amendment To The United States Constitution
In the event that the lower court's racially and politically restrictive

interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption is correct, which Defendants
dispute, the Defendants contend that the lower court should have granted
their motion to dismiss the criminal charges against them, because the Utah
Statutory Exemption, as written, is vague on its face and as applied to the
Defendants, and therefore denies them due process of law under Article I,
section 7 of the Utah Constitution which provides that "No person shall be

deprived of life liberty or property without due process of law", and under
the parallel provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.18
In Utah, the void for vagueness doctrine requires that a statute or
ordinance define an "offense with sufficient defmiteness that ordinary
people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does
not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Greenwood v.
City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991). See also, Baggett v.
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) ("In the analysis of a criminal law, the basic test
for vagueness is whether "men [and women] of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.") Where, as
in the instant case, the challenged statute implicates the fundamental rights
of Native American Church members against an establishment of religion by
the State and their rights to the free exercise of religious worship guaranteed
under Article I, Sections 1 and 4, and Article III, Section 1, of the Utah
Constitution, the parties challenging the statute as void on its face, need not
prove that the statute is "impermissibly vague" in all its applications. Jane v.
18 Because both provisions provide identical rights, no separate analysis
is required. See, SLW/Utah, Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998),
quoting West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1004-07 (Utah 1994)
("when a party asserts claims under both the Utah and federal constitutions,
this court ordinarily first determines the issue under the Utah Constitution
and only resorts to the federal Constitution if the state constitution is not
dispositive."

Bangerter, 794 F. Supp. 1537, 1541 (U.S.D.C. Utah 1992), quoting Hoffman
Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 497, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1192, 71 L.Ed.2d 362
(1982).
Here, the plain language of the Utah Statutory Exemption, providing
an exemption from criminal prosecution for the religious use of peyote by
"members of the Native American Church" in bona fide ceremonies of the
Native American Church, does not afford ordinary citizens, including the
Defendants, adequate notice that the language "members of the Native
American Church" utilized in the Exemption, excludes: (1) members of the
Defendant Native American Church who are not Native American Indians,
and (2) Native American Indian members who are not members of a
federally recognized tribe, and also because it fails to establish clear
guidelines for application of the exception. As the result, the Defendant
Native American Church and its spiritual leaders, the Defendants James and
Linda Mooney, could not reasonably have known that their conduct in
possessing and providing peyote to other members of the Defendant
Oklevueha Native American Church for religious use in bona ceremonies of
the Church, without regard to the race or political status of these members,
was prohibited under the Utah statutory exemption.

Accordingly, this Court should find that the prosecution of the
Defendants under the Utah Statutory Exemption, as written, is unconstitutionally vague on its face, and as applied to the Defendants, and violates
their rights to due process of law under Article I, section 7, of the Utah
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment. Based on this finding, the
Court should reverse the lower court's decision denying the Defendants'
motion to dismiss the criminal charges against them.
Ill

The Lower Court's Racially And Politically Restrictive
Interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption Violates
The Defendants' Rights Under The First Amendment
"The First Amendment to the United States Constitution has been

made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment." Whitehead, at
fn. 40, quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut. 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900,
903, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940). In order to pass muster under the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment, a government action must satisfy the two
step analysis of the "compelling interest" test. The Court must first
determine whether the Government's action "imposes any burden on the free
exercise of [the defendant's] religion." Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, at
403, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1794, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1963). Should such a burden
exist, the court must then "consider whether some compelling state interest

.. .justifies the substantial infringement of the [defendant's] First
Amendment right" and is "the least restrictive means of accomplishing a
compelling state interest." Id. at 406, 83 S.Ct. at 1795.
As previously discussed herein, the State has failed to demonstrate
that the lower court's racially and politically restrictive interpretation of the
Utah Statutory Exemption, furthers any "compelling interest" of the State of
Utah, which would justify the infringement of the rights of the Defendant
Native American Church and its spiritual leaders, the Defendants James and
Linda Mooney, in the practice of their fundamental religious beliefs and
practices as members of the Defendant Native American Church, or prove
that such interpretation is necessary or the least restrictive means of
achieving any such compelling interest. Accordingly, this Court should find
that the lower court's racially and restrictive interpretation of the Utah
Statutory Exemption, violates the Defendants' rights under the First
Amendment and reverse the lower court's denial of the Defendants' motion
to dismiss the criminal prosecution on this ground.
IV.

The Lower Court's Racially And Politically Restrictive
Interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption, Violates The
Defendants Rights Under The Equal Protection Clause
Of The Fourteenth Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution declares

that no state may deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws. Equal protection analysis requires strict scrutiny
analysis when the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of
a fundamental right or operates to the particular disadvantage of a suspect
class. Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia. 427 U.S. 307, 312
(1976). In the case at bar, the classification worked by the lower court's
racially and politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory
Exemption for the religious use of peyote by members of the Native
American Church, both interferes with fundamental religious rights under
Article I, sections 1 and 4 of the Utah Constitution, and "operates to the
particular disadvantage of a suspect class, e.g. non-Indian members of the
Native American Church, solely because of their race. In Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 201 (1995),19 the United States
Supreme Court also held that "all racial classifications" imposed by federal,
state, or local government actor, are "suspect" and must be analyzed under
strict scrutiny analysis. In Adarand, the Supreme Court held that a racial
classification should be upheld only where it is precisely tailored to

19 In Adarand, a contractor sued federal officials when, when, afler
making the low bid on the job, the job was awarded to a "disadvantaged"
minority business under a government contract clause. The Plaintiff
contractor claimed that the race-based presumptions used in the contract
clause violated the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause. Id. at 200.

accomplish a compelling government interest. In this regard, the Court
stated that
The standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is
not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by
a particular classification."..."The Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments protect persons, not groups." Therefore,
"[A]ny person, of whatever race, has the right to demand
that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution
justify a racial classification subjecting that person to
unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny."
Id. at 201-202 (internal citations omitted).
In this case, the lower court stated that, "the preference given to
Indian members of the Church is clearly not racial in nature, but political",
and that such classification is based on the federal government's duty to
preserve Native American Indian culture", See, Ruling, at 6-7, Addendum
I, the lower court failed to articulate how the exclusion of non-Indian
members of the Native American Church from the coverage of the Utah
Statutory Exemption, is necessary and the least restrictive means of
accomplishing this alleged interest. Thus, the lower court's racially
restrictive interpretation of Utah Statutory Exemption violates the Defendants' rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Similarly, lower court's politically restrictive interpretation of the
Utah Statutory Exemption as being limited, under AIRFAA, to members of

the Native American Church who are members of a federally recognized
tribe, See, Ruling, at 6-7, Addendum I, and excluding Native American
Indians who are not members of a federally recognized tribe, cannot evade
strict scrutiny analysis under the Equal Protection Clause by labeling the
classification "political." Id. Although the lower court relied on Peyote
Way, as support for this conclusion, See, Ruling, at 6, such reliance is
misplaced.
In Peyote Way , the court relied heavily on the United States
Supreme Court's prior decision in Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
In Morton, the Court upheld a BIA employment preference for applicants
that were "one-fourth or more degree Indian blood and be a member of a
federally -recognized tribe", stating that the classification was "political
rather than racial in nature." Id. at 553, n. 24 (Emphasis supplied).
The Court explained that, the BIA employment preference, "as
applied, is granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but rather as
members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose lives and activities are
governed by the BIA in a unique fashion." Id. at 554. In so holding, the
Supreme Court emphasized that the government preference did not pertain
to any government agency or activity other than "employment in the Indian

service" and that a similar preference concerning employment in other
federal agencies would present an "obviously more difficult question."
Id. at 554. Applying a "rational basis" test to the BIA hiring preference,
the Supreme Court upheld the BIA employment in preference for members
of federally recognized tribes in Morton, finding that it could be "tied
rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the
Indians," and that it was "reasonable and rationally designed to further
Indian self-government." Id. at 555.
Although the State in this case may argue that by not limiting the Utah
Statutory Exemption for the religious use of peyote by members of the Native
American Church to Native American Indians who are members of federally
recognized tribes, an impermissible racial classification would result under
Morton. However, the factual context of this case is immediately distinguishable from that addressed in Morton.
In Morton, the Supreme Court was solely concerned with issues of
Indian self-government and tribal sovereignty, concluding that the preference there was "rationally designed to further Indian self-government..."
Id. at 555.

However, in this case, we are dealing with the free exercise

20 In a more recent discussion of Morton, the Supreme Court again took
the opportunity to limit the case solely to its factual context, stating that

rights of Native American Indian members of the Native American Church.
Accordingly, the government's asserted interests in Morton do not dictate
the result here.21
Because the lower court fails to articulate how its politically
restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption is necessary, and is
the least restrictive means of furthering any compelling interest which would
override the infringement of the Defendants' fundamental religious rights
discussed herein, such interpretation violates the Defendants' rights to the
equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.22 Therefore,
this Court should find that the lower court erred in denying the Defendants'
motion to dismiss the criminal charges against them based on this ground
and reverse the lower court's decision.

"that case was confined to authority of the BIA, an agency described as 'sui
generis." Rice v. Cavetano, 528 U.S. 495, 519-520 (2000).
21 Defendants wish to acknowledge that their argument regarding Morton
is based, in part, on a panel decision of the Tenth Circuit, In the Matter of
Saenz, 00-2166 (10th Cir. 2001), which was subsequently vacated and
reheard and decided by the Tenth Circuit in its en banc decision in U.S. v.
Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1118 (10th Cir. 2002)
22 See, Adarand, at 224-225, quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22
(1948)] ("Political judgments regarding the necessity for the particular
classification may be weighed in the constitutional balance, but the standard
of justification will remain constant.")

CONCLUSION
The Defendant Oklevueha Earthwalks Native American Church, and
the Defendants James and Linda Mooney, as its spiritual leaders, respectfully
request the Court to find and declare that the lower court's racially and
politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption from
criminal prosecution for the religious use of peyote by members of the Native
American Church in bona fide Church ceremonies, violates their rights under
the Utah Constitution and the federal Constitution as discussed herein.
Based upon such findings, Defendants further request that the Court
reverse the decision of the lower court denying their motion to dismiss the
criminal charges against them.
DATED and respectfully submitted this 17th day of October, 2002.
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